

11/19/62

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CUBA CONTINGENCY PLAN

This memorandum consists of the following parts:

- PART I - Advice to NATO and OAS Governments regarding possible Cuban developments and US action.**
- PART II - Overflights and responses.**
- PART III - Additional steps to be taken in the event IL-28s not removed.**

PART I

ADVICE TO GOVERNMENTS

We should set in motion machinery to provide advice to the OAS and NATO Governments Tuesday--preferably in advance of the President's press conference. This would involve sending out telegrams Monday night--assuming that, prior to that time no word had been received from Khrushchev indicating a willingness to withdraw the IL-28s.

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A. Advice to our Embassies in NATO and OAS Capitals.

1. Ambassadors should arrange meetings with heads of governments or foreign ministers as early as possible on Tuesday, November 20.

2. Governments would be advised as follows:

(a) The United States has still been unable to obtain satisfactory performance from the USSR with regard to the withdrawal of the IL-28s and the establishment of arrangements for ^{in Cuba} group inspection and adequate safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons.

(b) Recent reconnaissance has confirmed the presence in Cuba of organized Soviet military units with the most modern field equipment. These cannot be disguised merely as "Soviet technicians".

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(c) Castro has now announced that he intends to fire on US reconnaissance planes. Continued US reconnaissance is essential action authorized by OAS resolution.

(d) Since the United States must continue surveillance, there is serious possibility of an incident against which the United States is determined to take retaliatory measures.

(e) The situation is fluid and may take one of several courses. The Soviets may act against Castro or, in any event, may not support him in exchanges that might follow his interference with US reconnaissance. The nature of the future US action will naturally depend upon which option the Soviets select.

(f) Continued

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(f) Continued refusal on the part of the USSR to withdraw the IL-28's might well require the re-establishment of the quarantine and its extension to POL.

(g) The President intends to make clear to the nation and the world on Tuesday afternoon the present posture of affairs and to indicate that an early resolution of the remaining problems must be achieved.

(h) The United States expects to be able to count on the full cooperation of its Allies in the event it becomes necessary to reimpose the quarantine--with or without an expanded proscribed list--or to take other appropriate action to deal with the situation.

B. Presidential letters containing the substance of the above message would be delivered by our ambassadors in Paris, Bonn

Bonn

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Bonn, and London. (In addition, the latest pictures are being sent to Paris for possible use with General de Gaulle at the same time.)

G. A briefing would be arranged for Tuesday afternoon with the NATO Atlantic Council.

H. Meeting of OAS Ambassadors.

1. Meeting to be called for Tuesday to advise the OAS Ambassadors of developments to date.

2. Full meeting of the Organ of Consultation to be called for Friday, at which time efforts would be made to obtain resolution along the lines of Annex A.

PART II

OVERFLIGHTS AND RESPONSES

A. High level overflights would be maintained on a

daily

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daily schedule through Wednesday and the decision as to the schedule thereafter would be made in light of responses to low-level flights. No low-level overflights before Wednesday, November 21.

B. In the event that a U-2 is fired upon--and whether or not brought down--an immediate protest would be made to the Soviet Government and action would be taken to eliminate the offending SAM site.

C. The targets for the low-level flights on Wednesday, November 21, would not be those associated with the IL-28s (i.e. St. Julian or Bolgoin) but would be some other target of military interest, such as a port where newly arrived Soviet ships are unloading.

D. It may be presumed that fire against low-level overflights would come from Cuban sources. Low-level

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reconnaissance

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Threats (Threats)

reconnaissance flights ~~will~~ be provided with an air cap
of 8-15 interceptors at intermediate altitudes offshore,
which would come in to suppress fire against the recon-
naissance planes.

B. If overflights are continued, particularly at low
level, the Cubans may attempt to interfere or may not do
so. If they do attempt to interfere and US responds as
indicated above, the Soviet Union will be faced with a
choice whether or not to support the Cubans by military
action--or whether to disengage. They can support the
Cubans by participating in the attacks on US planes,
utilizing their SAMs. They can also react by military action
in other areas. Alternatively they can confine their

reaction

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reaction to diplomatic protests which, in effect, ^{might} ~~would~~ indicate their intent to disengage.

The US must plan its own line of action based on any of the above contingencies. However, to the extent it proves feasible, we should pursue lines of action tending to encourage Soviet disengagement.

First Assumption. That the Soviet Union would support Cuban action by firing surface-to-air missiles. In the event that a US plane is brought down by a surface-to-air missile we have the option either of attacking one or more of the SAM-sites or of reinstalling the quarantine on an extended basis. In either event, we would be interfering directly by force with the Soviet Union--assuming that the SAM-sites are, in fact, in their hands in spite of their disavowal.

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Second Assumption. That the Soviet Union would support Cuban action by reacting elsewhere. US action would have to be generally in line with the contingency planning for the location where the Soviet reaction occurred.

Third Assumption. That the Soviet Union would give vocal and diplomatic, but not physical, support to Cuban action against our aircraft. In this instance, our policy should be designed, so far as possible, to encourage further Soviet disengagement. This would seem to indicate a withholding of any action--such as the reinstitution of the quarantine--that might result in a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we could permit the air action and counter-action to escalate to the point where we might be able to take effective military steps against the Castro regime.

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PART III

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PART III

**ADDITIONAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT
IL-28s ARE NOT REMOVED**

If the IL-28s are not removed we can again follow one of two courses: We can get at them through Castro or confront the Soviet Union more directly. The natural means of pressure on Castro would be through intensive surveillance and air action. The alternative would be the reinstitution of some form of quarantine. This section is directed mainly to the question of ways and means of using the quarantine against the IL-28s.

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A. Form of Quarantine.

The emphasis of the quarantine should be on the interdiction of imports of POL. Quite possibly we could employ a hail-and-pass procedure for most dry cargo ships, requiring the inspection only of particularly suspicious vessels. We could justify interfering with imports of POL on the ground that POL was directly related to the utilization of the IL-28s.

B. Objective of Quarantine.

The minimum objective of the quarantine should be the removal of the IL-28s. However, a substantial argument can be made in favor of conditioning the termination of the quarantine also upon effective and continuing on-site verification--something which Castro would find very hard to accept.

It is not recommended that the termination of the quarantine be tied explicitly

to the

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to the continuing maintenance of Cuba as a Soviet military base, since this would amount to an extension of the initial terms of the bargain.

One clear incidental benefit of the quarantine would be its adverse effect upon the Cuban economy and, hence upon Castro. If continued any length of time, the quarantine would require the adoption of such restrictions as the use of FOL--both domestic and military--as to accelerate the economic deterioration of Cuba.

C. Means of enforcing the quarantine.

These means would be essentially the same as in the last case; however, it would be desirable to increase the presence of other hemisphere naval forces on the line of blockade.

D. Priorities

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D. Priorities of Enforcement.

In the eventual application of a PMA quarantine it would be best to begin with non-Bloc tankers under Bloc charter, proceeding to Bloc tankers, and then to Soviet tankers, in that order.

E. Assumptions under which quarantine recommended.

The above discussion suggests that we should probably not reestablish the quarantine unless the Soviet Union gives military support to Cuban action against our reconnaissance planes.

Once this had been ascertained by events, the desirability of going forward with the quarantine would then have to be determined on the basis of a prediction as to whether or not the Soviets would acquiesce in the quarantine or

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forcibly resist it. (In the Knox interview, Khrushchev is quoted as saying that he might permit one or two ships to stop and be searched but would sink the American vessel that obstructed the third one.)

The quarantine offers the advantage that it need not immediately involve a physical confrontation--although the credibility of the American action would be gravely weakened if, in this second chapter, we did not act with reasonable decision. Presumably, however, some time might be permitted in which to make it possible for Khrushchev to agree to remove the IL-28s.

Arguments can be marshalled both for and against the contention that Khrushchev would acquiesce. In support of such contention, it could be maintained:

(1) The

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(1) The Soviet Union might be willing to withhold the further supply to Cuba of items on the prescribed list and let the Cuban economy deteriorate, since it may regard Cuba as a wasting asset.

(2) Khrushchev backed down when he was in a much stronger position than he is now. At that time he had missiles pointed against the United States; now he has no such bargaining counter.

(3) By acquiescing the second time, Khrushchev could again seek the propaganda value of being the peace-maker.

Against these arguments it can be asserted:

(1) Khrushchev yielded to the threat of our quarantine once by turning his ships around; he could not afford the humiliation of doing so a second time--especially after the

missiles

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missiles have been removed and he has thus claimed to have complied fully with his undertakings.

(2) Khrushchev was willing to pull back his ships carrying sophisticated weapons in order to safeguard USSR technology. He would not have a similar motive for holding back tankers filled with POL.

(3) The USSR could not stand idly by while the economy of a Socialist state was slowly strangled; the loss of face and the appearance of impotence would be too high a price for Khrushchev to pay.

(4) He cannot be sure that the Soviets would have acquiesced if we had actually boarded and searched a vessel. After all, we were imposing on a limited form of quarantine; we let their tankers through.

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The resolution of the question posed by these competing contentions is important but not necessarily controlling. Even if it appeared probable that Khrushchev might insist on running the blockade the proponents of the quarantine could still argue that the reaction would probably be limited to a restricted arena. There would be less danger of escalation in a sea action than in the reprisal for an air attack and in the event of sea action we would have clear superiority.

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11/19/62

MESSAGE TO GENERAL DE GAULLE
CHANCELLOR ADENAUER
PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

I think it is time for me to give you a further account of the situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it. I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 6:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

It is still possible that between now and Tuesday evening the Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, I shall be able to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and I shall be able to concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary for me to focus attention upon this

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Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the bargain. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States is being called for Friday and that at that meeting we shall ask for a reaffirmation of the Resolution of October 23rd which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed forces. In effect, we shall be asking for renewed authorization for action which may involve air attack on selected installations in Cuba, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of extending the quarantine would be to add oil products to the list of prohibited items, since these are directly related to the operation of bombers.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because the Soviet missiles are no longer pointed at us. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of

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our pressure against ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~direct~~ ^{directly} Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet armored units, with a total strength of perhaps 8,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12-16,000 men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I am not yet prepared to make precise choices among the numerous courses of action available to us, but I do expect to indicate clearly tomorrow that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards.

In this general situation, while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem.

CONFIDENTIAL**DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION**

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WHEREAS:

The Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, on October 23, 1962 determined by incontrovertible evidence that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, had secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

At that meeting the Organ of Consultation called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability and recommended that the member states take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capabilities from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;

The Organ of Consultation also informed the Security Council of the United Nations of its resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations and expressed the hope that the Security Council would, in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the

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In accordance with the resolution of October 23, the Government of the United States on October 24, 1962 established a quarantine to interdict the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba and subsequently the Governments of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela offered military forces or facilities as contributions to this collective action;

The Organ of Consultation on November 5, 1962 adopted a resolution recommending that the participating countries in the quarantine operations work out directly among themselves the technical measures necessary for the coordinated and effective action of the combined forces, pursuant to which there has been established an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force;

In correspondence between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, it was agreed that:

(1) The USSR would remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use; and the USSR would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba; and

(2) The United States would -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--

(a) remove

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(a) remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect; and

(b) give assurances against an invasion of Cuba;

The Government of Cuba has failed to cooperate in arrangements to ensure that all offensive weapons have been removed from and are not reintroduced into Cuba;

As a result of these facts, the threat to the peace and security of the Continent created by the presence in Cuba of offensive weapons has not been effectively terminated, and satisfactory arrangements have not been made to prevent the recurrence of this threat;

THEREFORE,

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
ACTING PROVISIONALLY AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION, RESOLVES:

1. To recommend that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, individually and collectively, in order to bring about the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba and to safeguard against their reintroduction into Cuba, consider taking additional measures, including, but not limited to the following:

(a) Intensify aerial surveillance of Cuba,

(b) Intensify quarantine measures against Cuba;

2. To reaffirm in all respects its resolution of October 23, 1962;

3. To

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3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations;

4. To continue to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation and to request the Member States to keep the Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph 1 of this resolution and paragraph 2 of the resolution of October 23, 1962.

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

**SUBJECT: Cuban Refugee Groups Hoping to Liberate Their
Homeland**

QUESTION: Are we required to stop all actions, large or small, by refugee groups hoping to liberate their own homeland?

ANSWER : In the absence of any real performance by the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, this question does not really arise. The questions before us now are the withdrawal of the bombers, and the obtaining of positive verification that all the offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba, and adequate safeguards against their reintroduction.

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Non-Invasion Pledge on Cuba *ASSURANCE*

QUESTION: Will a "non-invasion" pledge by the U.S. require any quid pro quo from Castro?

ANSWER : Yes. Castro himself will have to first approve -- and permit -- arrangements which will adequately confirm that all Soviet offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba. He will also have to approve -- and permit -- long-term safeguards against the reintroduction of such weapons.

QUESTION: Will he also have to provide the United States with a guarantee that he will not attempt to pursue a policy of subversion in the hemisphere?

ANSWER : No. Reciprocal guarantees of this sort have little, if any, real meaning. But let me make clear that our attitude towards Cuba, and what political and economic actions against Castro we might take, depends on whether or not *CUBA* displays a desire to live in peace with its neighbors.

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Intelligence gap on existence of
offensive weapons in Cuba

QUESTION: How do you explain the so-called intelligence
gap in determining the existence of offensive
weapons in Cuba?

ANSWER: On the question of intelligence about Soviet arms
in Cuba, let me simply say this. Throughout the
months preceding the discovery of offensive mis-
siles in Cuba, the many resources of the intelli-
gence community were steadily directed to ana-
lyzing, disproving, or verifying all rumors and
reports about Soviet activities in Cuba. This
was a major undertaking; involving as it did
not only the separation of accurate reports from
inaccurate ones, but also the systematic continu-
ation of intelligence collection activities.
The first moment that hard intelligence of the
existence of offensive missiles in Cuba was ob-
tained on October 15, the policy discussions be-
gan which led to the decision announced October 22.

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In a field as complicated as intelligence, the
available information is rarely all that is needed
or desired. However, I can assure you in all
seriousness that knowledge of the developing situ-
ation in Cuba represented not an intelligence
failure, but a major intelligence triumph. I be-
lieve that all Americans owe a debt of gratitude to
the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone,
and to all the members of the intelligence com-
munity who supported him in his efforts. I am
sure you will agree with me that the public inter-
est will not be served by detailed spe culation
concerning the internal operations of this intelli-
gence effort.

BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Non-Invasion Pledge on Cuba.

QUESTION: What will be the nature and extent of a "no invasion" commitment on Cuba which you may be prepared to give? When would the United States be willing to give this commitment?

ANSWER: At the moment this question remains academic. In the absence of necessary verification within Cuba that all offensive weapons have been removed and the establishment of adequate safeguards against their return as set forth in my understanding with Chairman Khrushchev, there is no occasion for (formal) U. S. assurances on the subject of invasion. (But this does not mean that we want to invade Cuba.) As I said on September 13, "We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere" if offensive weapons systems are removed, kept out of this hemisphere in the future -- and if there is no effort to export aggressive communist purposes from Cuba -- and if there is no interference from Cuba with our own security, there can be peace in the Caribbean. And that is what this Government wants.

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Non-Invasion Pledge on Cuba


QUESTION: Would a "no invasion" assurance mean that our opposition to Castro would cease or ease off considerably?

ANSWER : Not at all. Castro was a major hemisphere problem even before the introduction of Russian offensive weapons into the hemisphere. He remains a major hemisphere problem even after all of the offensive weapons leave. At Punta del Este there was unanimous agreement that Casto-communism in Cuba is "incompatible" with the Inter-American system. This "incompatibility", which was unrelated to the Soviets' introduction of offensive weapons, still exists. This incompatibility (need not necessarily be dealt with by invasion.) (But at the same time a non-invasion assurance would not mean that we would also lift the political and economic measures which were previously imposed in the light of Castro's attitude toward the other nations of this hemisphere.

*Castro's position
of submission
must be clear*

*Have no intention of
lifting*

must be dealt with



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Question - Under what circumstances would Cuba be permitted to participate again in the OAS?

Answer - The decision by the Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este to exclude the Cuban Government from participation in the OAS was based on two grounds: its adherence to Marxism-Leninism and its alignment with the communist bloc. While I cannot, of course, speak for the OAS, ^{BUT} the United States for its part would urge that a Cuban Government which rejects the tenets of Marxism-Leninism be welcomed back to the inter-American system. We remain confident that the Cuban people will not permanently tolerate the betrayal of their revolution to international communism. When the true leaders of Cuba succeed in returning their revolution to its original aims the United States for its part stands ready to recognize promptly and to enter into a friendly relationship with them or any other representative groups in Cuba that succeed in establishing a government responsive to the desires and aspirations of the Cuban people.

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BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

November 20, 1962

SUBJECT: Castro's Five Points

QUESTION: What role does Castro's five points play in the present negotiations? Are any of them under active negotiation between the United States, Russia or Cuba?

ANSWER: Castro's five points play no role whatsoever in the present negotiations.